

4/29/04 Interview ^{Captain} ~~Admiral~~ Charles Joseph LeidiG

DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2012-042, document no. 26
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: September 29, 2014

- J. Farmer
- K. Shaeffer
- M. KARA
- COL. SUSAN KUEHL
- Capt. Al Dronenburg - Legal Adviser

Re 9-11

- 9/10/01 - Deputy for Command Ctr Operations ~~(06)~~ (06)
- Job - make sure CC operated properly all the way down to plumbing.
- Arrived in July 2001.
- He was permitted to substitute for the 5 Generals or Admirals who supervise the Watch Teams. - (There are 5 ops teams).
- He was asked by Mr. Winfield to substitute for him.
- DDO on 9/11 - Mr. Winfield
↳ Captain LeidiG filled in for Winfield.
- ADDO - Pat Gardner

- He met w/ DDI ~~early~~ that morning. (Deputy Director of Intel.)
↳ got briefed by DDI.
- He checked in w/ EA Cell and w/ ADDO ~~Pat~~ Gardner.
- He reviewed docs and stay up to date on everything.
- Nothing remarkable about the brief he rec'd that day.
- He relieved Gen. Winfield.
- * — Shortly thereafter, he saw T.V. news reports that a plane had hit WTC. (report said a light, small A/C hit WTC).
- Pat Gardner (ADD0) and he discussed how a light A/C could have hit WTC.

J-3
Vice Chief
Chambers's office
SEC DEF'S
Watchstander

He and/or Gardner decided to notify J-3, Vice Chief's office, Chambers's office, SEC DEF'S Watchstander that a light, small A/C hit WTC based on T.V. report.

— They decided to have Pat Gordan^{on the 500} call FAA to see if they knew anything more.

— FAA said they had a report of hijack in progress but had no knowledge of small ALC crash into WTC-1.

{ Gordan asked FAA if they needed help with their hijack and FAA said NO because the pilot responded that it was okay and they were going to land in N.Y. Airport soon.

→ This occurred before WTC-2 crash.

— He believes they called FAA Watch Desk.

— He made at least 2 rounds of notification (1 after WTC-1 Impact and 1 after WTC-2 Crash) to Executive Authorities. (e.g. SEC DEF^U Office)

— In second notification he believes he advised that FAA reported a hijack and said it was going to land in N.Y.

- He sees WTC-2 Crash live on T.V.
- It is immediately obvious this is a Coordinated Attack / Terrorist Attack.
- They convene a SIEC to get advice re: best military action to take.
- No recall if they made an attempt to call FAA after WTC-2 Crash.
- He wanted to promptly notify Senior leadership after WTC-2 crash and get guidance.
- Senior Operations Officer (SOO) sits outside office that houses DDO and ADDO.
- SIEC convened sometime after WTC 2 Crash.
There was no compliance protocol for a terrorist event.
- They discussed who was needed in SIEC Conference.

- * — As the DDO of the NMCC, he has the Authority to convene a SIEC.
- Notification process exists whereby NMCC would ~~not~~ normally notify WH situation room.
- A lot of phone calls came in to NMCC asking for additional information.
- Between 9:03 A.M. and the start of ATCC at 9:25 A.M. (approx.) he has no information from FAA or elsewhere that suggests additional AIC ~~are~~ are airborne and could be ~~the~~ missiles headed for Targets.
- His first knowledge of danger to Pentagon was when Sec 4:33 Star aide called him to advise him that there was an explosion at Pentagon. He was asked to check source of explosion and advised "We may be under attack".
- (Sec CINC Strod recommended launching the 2 NAOC birds)

- * { — Before Plane hit Pentagon, they knew there was a terrorist attack but did not know it was still ongoing.
- He was not thinking about or discussing launching the NAOC^S until the Pentagon was struck.
- The ADDO (Pat Gardner) would have been on the NOI WOV Call (9:16 AM - 9:25 AM)
- Does not remember getting a lot of information from NORAD or others before convening SIEC.
- He does not know if NMCC was on an FAA multi-agency Telecon.
- ~~ATCC~~ ^{SIEC} report from NORAD that hijacked A/C is headed to D.C. (between 9:25 AM and 9:29 AM)
↓
- He decides to transition from SIEC to an ATCC when he hears the above information.

- When he transitions to ATCC → many national leaders are notified.
- NMCC is a coordinating unit at this point.
- NMCC is taking reports ~~of~~ re: aftermath of attack on Pentagon.
- He thinks SDO or the ADDO is trying to raise FAA on a separate phone to get them in the ATCC.
- He heard that AIC struck Pentagon on ~~CNN~~ news (T.V.).
- ^{-DDO} Wenfield returned to NMCC after plane struck Pentagon.
- He thought they were talking to the right people when they called the FAA Operations Center.
- Not aware of FAA Herndon CC facility.
- NORAD was on ATCC.
- No other continuous open line at NMCC that he is

— Delta FL 1989 reported as a possible (4th) hijack.

— He thinks ^(Vice) Chairman-myers was in room when NMCC recommended evacuation of Sears Tower b/c of D 1989.

— After Plane hit Pentagon - 30-35 Admirals, Friends and SEC DEF staff were in NMCC.

— ~~NMCC~~ ATCC - reference to closing down all Civil Aviation (land all planes) occurs on Call w/out prior discussion.

ATCC — 9:55 Am. - reference to putting a fighter Cap up over D.C.

— He recalls report that A/C previously headed for Chicago had then changed its course and was headed to Wash D.C..

— He linked PEOC report of A/C 25 minutes ~~miles~~ out of D.C. to the earlier reports of A/C headed to Chicago (possibly headed to Sears Tower).

- General Myers was on phone with Senior Air Force friends trying to get support.

ATTC - PEOC reports A/C = UAL 93 is headed TO D.C. and is 20 minutes away from D.C.

5/11

↳ Capt. Feistly recalls this and did believe an A/C was headed TO strike the Pentagon again.

- He asks NORAD if any A/C had been scrambled on UAL 93.

↳ NORAD said A/C had been scrambled from Atlantic City.

ATCC - He says NMCC has FAA on a separate line. → (he believes that ADDO has FAA on ~~the~~ a separate line).

- ATCC - reference to Weapons free → he says this was not the passing of shoot down order. → Shoot Down order was explicit and came later.

- You could hear a pin drop when order was given.

- PEOC reports V.P. has cleared us
to engage inbound A/C if we
can confirm it is a hijacked A/C that
is headed TO D.C.
- He recalls someone said - W.H.
says when A/C is 15 minutes
outside of D.C. - Permission is
granted to shoot down A/C.
- He distinctly recalls this as the
moment of confirmation that "we were
at War". → When someone
conveyed the V.P. said on V.P.
himself said fighters are cleared
to shoot down A/C when it
is 15 minutes from D.C. if
they confirm it is a hijacked A/C.
- He remembers report of A/C down
in Pennsylvania very soon after shoot
down order was given.
- ROE - "It was pretty clear that the
V.P. passed the [shoot down] order."
↓
- NORAD was on the line at the time.

- He does not recall any specific discussions of ROE.
- * - General Winfield takes over the ATCC from Leiding.
- He believed Andrews fighters were over D.C.
- SVTS - SecDEF left NMCC area to join SVTS Conference.
- He recalls discussion about going to DEFCON 3.
- Someone told Vice Chairman Myers he had the authority to declare DEFCON 3.
 - ↳ Myers asked for proof, ~~and~~ Leiding grabbed the book and someone showed Gen. Myers the provision that vested him with authority to declare DEFCON 3.
- No recollection if NORAD called NMCC for information prior to his decision to establish SIEC.

- He was not aware that major Chambers was in EA room.
- Not aware that maj. Chambers ~~was~~ received call from FAA on 9/11.
- Major Chambers → Surveillance Officer.

DDO = Deputy Director of operations.